Palestinian citizens of Israel
2013-06-16
The sociological and political developments within the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel
and the ongoing estrangement policies of the state vis-a`-vis this community have led to growing
tensions and increased confrontation between the two sides. The leadership of the Arab-
Palestinian community and the leadership of the state, especially the right-wing government
that won power in early 2009, understand that state–minority relations can be viewed in internal
Israeli terms but also as a central component of the broader Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Neither
leadership has decided clearly which understanding is preferable. As a result, one can speak
of a spectrum of relationships between the state and the Arab-Palestinian community within it
that keep shifting, mostly in the direction of confrontation rather than conciliation. This shift
brings to the fore the need for new models of analysis that go beyond a vertical understanding
of Israeli–Palestinian relations. Horizontal conceptions, where the entire Israeli control system
is viewed as one entity in which the normalization of Jewish life leads to the fragmentation and
ghettoization of Palestinian life, are more accurate to an understanding of Israeli policies and
Palestinian reactions in the last decade.
This chapter demonstrates that the gap in the expectations of both sides is the major cause
of their bad relationship. Before continuing, it is important to note that, for the sake of clarity,
this essay regards the relationship between the state and the Arab-Palestinian community as one
between two ‘‘homogeneous’’ players. State and minority are seen as two active agents, operating
in circumstances that condition their mutual behavior.
The state is not a unified political agent. It is a complex institutional structure that can have
contradictory policies. The Arab-Palestinian minority is also a complex social entity, wherein
different groups can have contradictory interests. Notwithstanding this argument, it is claimed
that the mechanisms of delegitimizing the Arab-Palestinian minority facilitated by state institutions,
especially the Knesset, and the resulting areas of contention exploited by the Arab-
Palestinian minority have been on the rise in the last decade. In the triangular relationship
between contention, accommodation, and control we witness a clear retreat from the mutual
accommodation of both parties and a growing tendency towards contention on the part of the
Arab-Palestinian minority and towards new forms of control by the Israeli state.
Recent developments in state–minority relations raise questions as to the future status of the
Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel and future trends in this relationship, especially in light of
two major external processes. The first is the stalemate in the peace process between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority and the continuation of Israel’s repressive policies in the Occupied
Territories. The second is the policies adopted by a growing number of states, especially in
Europe and North America, to accommodate the individual and collective rights of various
types of minority (McGarry et al. 2008). These two processes reflect contradictory trends in
conflict resolution and management and have negative repercussions on state–minority relations
in Israel.
The horizons of expectations of both parties form a central factor in determining the role of
past experience and present relationship; it is therefore necessary to look at both sides in order
to explain the rising tensions and to predict possible developments. In general, state expectations
of the Palestinian minority were based on citizenship as accommodation and submission.
The state adopted policies of control and neglect in order to meet these expectations. On the
other hand, the Palestinian minority expected the state to recognize its substantial citizenship,
respect its indigenous status, accommodate its individual and collective rights, and integrate its
members as equals in all realms of public life.
In the early years of the state, the minority accepted the framework of majority–minority
relations as determining its status. It submitted itself to policies of integration. But, as a result
of state control and neglect, a new discourse of contention arose, involving the basic demand
that, as the indigenous people of Palestine colonized by an immigrant-settler movement that
uprooted them from their homeland, their collective rights be accommodated. The disappointment
of the Palestinians occasioned by state policies led to a major shift in their expectations
and a refusal to accept the majority–minority citizenship framework as determining the relationship
between the two sides. The state policy of ‘‘hollowing out’’ Arab citizenship until it
becomes devoid of meaning and the continuation of the occupation encouraged calls by the
Arab-Palestinian community for closer bonds with Palestinian communities in the Occupied
Territories and for the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. The Arab-Palestinian demand
for the normalization of relations between their community and the rest of the Palestinian people
was viewed by the state as ‘‘radicalization’’ and as a betrayal of their loyalty.
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